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Abstract
Knowledge leakage poses a critical risk to the competitive advantage of knowledge-intensive organisations.
Although knowledge leakage is a human-centric security issue, little is known about leakage resulting from
individual behaviour and the protective strategies and controls that could be effective in mitigating leakage
risk. Therefore, this research explores the perspectives of security practitioners on the key factors that
influence knowledge leakage risk in the context of knowledge-intensive organisations. We conduct two focus
groups to explore these perspectives. The research highlights three types of behavioural controls that
mitigate the risk of knowledge leakage: human resource management practices, knowledge security
training and awareness practices, and compartmentalisation practices.
Keywords: Information Security, Knowledge leakage, information security risk, knowledge-intensive
organisations, competitive advantage
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1 INTRODUCTION
Knowledge-intensive Organisations (KIOs) face a critical risk of the erosion of their knowledge assets,
which is known as knowledge leakage (KL). Knowledge assets are described as the accumulated
intellectual property of KIOs (including knowledgeable workers and their expertise). KIOs create,
operate, and implement ‘know-how’ as a competing product – this is their Intellectual Property (IP).
Literature argues that KIOs assign the responsibilities of protecting knowledge assets to security
management (Hislop et al. 2018). In security management, the human aspect of a KL threat is more
elusive and perplexing than technical aspects (Crossler et al. 2013). This is because individuals may
temporarily neglect or ignore knowledge protection controls. Although literature is devoted to various
topics concerning knowledge protection and KL (Frishammar et al. 2015), these studies acknowledge
limitations in exploring the criticality of KL from the social perspective. Our research aims to identify
and present human-generated KL risks and key controls that mitigate them. A key practice-based
motivation for this study is to assist security practitioners and scholars to better monitor and manage
KL and the potential threats arising from KL. We therefore pose the following research question:
From security practitioner’s perspectives, what key factors affect knowledge leakage risk?
This research examines the key factors affecting KL behavioural risk. To guide this research, we have
explored security practitioners’ perspectives on the key facilitators and security controls of KL
behavioural risk in the context of KIOs. KIOs are different from traditional organisations, they are
“companies where most work can be said to be of an intellectual nature and where well-educated,
qualified employees form the major part of the workforce” (Alvesson 2004). For KIOs, knowledge assets
are their primary wealth creator and should be considered more valuable than other assets (physical).
Further, knowledgeable workers are different from regular employees in that they are authorised to work
directly with organisation’s confidential knowledge assets (Hislop et al. 2018).

2 BACKGROUND
Discussion of the phenomena of KL occurs in many disciplines, including: knowledge management,
innovation management, strategic management, and information security (Durst 2019). Knowledge
leakage (KL) is “the deliberate or accidental loss of knowledge to unauthorised personnel within or
outside of an organisation boundary” (Ahmad et al. 2014). A substantial body of literature affirms that
the erosion of competitive advantage is the largest threat from KL (Jiang et al. 2013). Frishammar et al.
(2015) demonstrate that when rivals obtain knowledge about a firm’s product, the competitive
uniqueness of KIOs would be limited. Ritala et al. (2015) adds that loss of revenue is another
consequence of KL. Additionally, the consequence of reputational damage, including doubts about the
trustworthiness of a firm that has experienced leaks, can be devastating (Jiang et al. 2013). Building on
KL reported in the literature, papers fall into three dimensions: technology (Agudelo-Serna et al. 2016),
operational (Frishammar et al. 2015), and human (Durst 2019).

2.1 Technology Dimension
Studies highlight that poor security practice is a large source of KL (Durst and Zieba 2019; Hislop et al.
2018). The issues discussed relate mainly to emerging technologies. For example, poor security practices
for BYOD are discussed from the perspective of organisational practice and employee behaviour.
Allowing employees to BYOD (such as phones and laptops) was the most often reported factor in
sensitive KL incidents (Agudelo-Serna et al. 2017). The arising knowledge leakage risk (KLR) seems to
be related to poor risk assessment on the part of the organisation, as well as technical issues with the
devices themselves (including bugs and vulnerabilities). Agudelo-Serna et al. (2017) argue that KL may
also occur through these devices as a result of an organisation failing to sufficiently assess BYOD risks.
The improper management of emerging technologies may also lead to KL. Emerging technologies
related to KL include cloud computing technologies (Ahmad et al. 2014) and social networking
(Christina et al. 2016). Emerging technologies create a number of unexpected KLRs (Hislop et al. 2018).
For example, Christina et al. (2016) illustrate that the use of social media poses an internal leakage risk.
Another form of leakage occurs with inter-organisational digital collaboration (Jiang et al. 2013).
Therefore, if organisations do not securely manage digital communications, employees could leak
confidential knowledge through these channels.

2.2 Operational Dimension
The operational dimension is widely discussed in the literature in correlation with KLR. It considers
securing the firm’s internal and external coordination and collaboration activities. Intra-organisational
coordination refers to when internal teams from different departments collaborate to perform a task.
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Lee et al. (2017) found that limitations in studying internal-to-internal leakage risk facilitated leakage
behaviour among employees. Moreover, blurry boundaries in internal coordination also lead to
confidential KL (Durst and Zieba 2019; Ritala et al. 2018). If a firm fails to implement adequate security
guidelines on knowledge exchange among and within teams, knowledgeable employees may accidently
share confidential knowledge with unauthorised employees. Inter-organisational collaboration refers to
external activities with other organisations (e.g. outsourcing). Inadequate security practices around
these collaborations leads employees to perform intentional or unintentional KL (Durst and Zieba 2019).
Jiang et al. (2013) explains this phenomenon: ‘If firms exchange their rent-generating knowledge
beyond the firm boundary, such as inter-firm strategic alliance, the knowledge is susceptible to
expropriation hazards.’ Inkpen et al. (2019) suggests that unintentional KL to unauthorised personnel
might occur when an employee working for the partner firm accidentally shares business-critical
knowledge not meant for exposure. Conversely, Frishammar et al. (2015) demonstrates that a leakage
culture may exist in third-party firms as they may deliberately leak KIO innovations to competitors. In
this leakage situation, the leakage risk arises due to poor risk assessment practices from the KIOs.

2.3 Human Dimension
Although KLR is strongly related to the human dimension, studies investigating the human factors of
KL are few. Literature has focused on embedding the human dimension within technology and
operations (Ritala et al. 2018). For technology, individuals intentionally or unintentionally share
business-critical knowledge through IT artefacts (Christina et al. 2016). The literature in the technology
dimension neglects the social aspect of the issue. In the operational dimension, the human attribute is
positioned within supply chain or collaborative processes (Lee et al. 2017). Researchers highlight that
individuals may leak knowledge inadvertently, or on purpose, during formal or informal occasions
(Frishammar et al. 2015; Ritala et al. 2015). Inkpen et al. (2019) illustrates that organisations face a KL
issue as employees leave the organisation. This issue is exacerbated when knowledgeable employees join
competitors. Further, Nishat Faisal et al. (2007) found a correlation between deliberate KL attempts
from employees and incentives offered by competitors. Therefore, the individual employee plays a
critical role in how knowledge is leaked. Shabtai et al. (2012) note that with BYOD, employees can carry
confidential knowledge with them wherever they go. As a result, some employees may believe that
constantly transporting confidential knowledge is a secure behaviour. A recent systematic review (Durst
and Zieba 2019) suggests that the KL issue proliferates when organisations do not properly educate their
employees about leakage risks associated with mobile devices. Therefore, from the employee’s
perspective, misuse of portable devices could lead to KL. Agudelo-Serna et al. (2017) found strong
evidence that knowledgeable employees could accidentally leak confidential knowledge because they
might be unaware of the risks linked to their mobile devices. Therefore, improper training and
awareness practices would result in reckless employee behaviour regarding the security of knowledge.

2.4 Knowledge Leakage Risk Controls
Our review of the literature on knowledge protection uncovered that organisations should implement
several controls to prevent KL behaviour. First, organisations should have an asset classification system
that classifies knowledge assets based on their level of sensitivity. Sensitivity classification is an
economic decision—that is, the knowledge asset should be classified based on its economic value to the
organisation. The impact of that asset being leaked should also be considered in the classification
process (Kramer and Bradfield 2010).
Second, the literature highlights the importance of human resource practices in preventing KLR.
Olander et al. (2015) concluded that HR departments that communicate protection responsibilities to
employees tend to obtain higher employee commitment and loyalty towards organisation assets.
Moreover, they highlight the importance of ongoing monitoring activities that profile employees to
understanding the risk associated with them. Shaw and Stock (2011) report that organisations are
dependent upon their Intellectual Property (IP) should institute prior hiring practices such as
background checks and interviews.
Third, creating a security culture and making employees aware has been also widely discussed in the
literature. Training and awareness practices are aimed to make employees more vigilant about security
risks (Alshaikh et al. 2018). Yalabik et al. (2017) suggest that training programs might change the
employees’ negative traits as they relate to the organisation’s assets and increase their commitment to
the organisation. However, Yalabik et al. (2017) suggests that training and awareness practices would
increase the employees’ consciousness of social engineering attempts from authorised individuals.
Lastly, restricted access of knowledge assets has been discussed in the KL literature in terms of
compartmentalisation (Ahmad et al. 2014; Baldwin and Henkel 2015). Compartmentalisation in
information security is described as a restriction on accessing and communicating an organisation’s
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confidential assets between different groups (Elliott et al. 2019). Compartmentalisation can be
implemented physically, where organisations have different offices for knowledgeable employees—that
would increase protection of an organisation’s valuable resources and limited KL.

3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research was undertaken with an exploratory, qualitative design to investigate security
practitioners’ views of the key factors of KL in KIOs. The design allows for a better understanding of a
particular issue (Neuman 2014); therefore, it has been used in information system studies to seek a
better understanding of specific information systems cases (Shedden et al. 2016) and, more specifically,
behavioural information security research (Chatterjee et al. 2015; Crossler et al. 2013). We first propose
a descriptive KL framework (see Section 4). Second, we conduct 2 focus groups using the generated
scenarios in our KL framework. We invited 10 participants to undertake the research across two focus
groups of 5 each, however for the second focus group only two participants were able to attend (see Table
1 for participants). Using the focus group technique allowed participants to exchange views and further
explain their ideas and experiences (Creswell 2018). After completing the group discussions, data
saturation was achieved, as no new information from the analysed data emerged (Ness 2015). We used
thematic analysis to analyse the focus group data as it provides the accessibility and flexibility to reassess
and analyse the collected data.
ID
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7

Experience (Years)
17+
13+
10+
7+
26+
20+
28+

Industry
ICT
Education
Software services
Consulting
Consulting
Government and Research
ICT

Role
Information Technology Manager
Security Analyst
Senior Security Manager
Information Security Consultant
Information Security Consultant
Chief Information Security Officer
Security Manager

Table 1 Participants’ characteristics.

4 RESEARCH DESIGN
As KLR is a human-centred phenomenon, exploring KLR through a behavioural information security
lens is required (Hislop et al. 2018). Crossler et al. (2013) describe behavioural information security
research as a “subfield of the broader InfoSec field that focuses on the behaviours of individuals which
[is] related to information and information systems assets”. Crossler et al. (2013) recommends utilising
reported, instead of self-reported, behavioural scenarios to better reflect the objectivity of building the
data collection questionnaire and increasing data reliability, as intentions do not always lead to action.
Therefore, the authors have opted to extensively explore reported KL incidents in academic and
professional literature. KL poses a threat to the organisation’s confidential knowledge assets. To better
understand this threat, security researchers have argued that modelling is a good tool for providing a
bigger picture of security issues (Shostack 2014). Therefore, as this research’s aim is to explore KL
behavioural risk, modelling this risk assists in identifying examples of knowledge disclosure. One of the
key strategies in structuring the threat modelling is focusing on attackers (Shostack 2014). As KL
behavioural risk is a human-centric issue, an attacker-driven strategy is adopted. This approach specifies
possible approaches used by people who might intentionally or unintentionally attack the organisation’s
assets. (Shostack 2014) argue that an attacker-driven approach is helpful when the study aims to explain
who might attack the organisation assets and humanises the risk by adding a human threat agent. As
studies investigating the key factors of KL behavioural risk are underdeveloped, the data leakage
scenario classification parameters suggested by Shabtai et al. (2012) guide the development of our KL
scenarios. Accorsi et al. (2015) illustrate that the data leakage classification assists identifying potential
covert leakage channels; therefore, participants would be exposed to KL scenarios that they might not
previously have experienced. To better validate our generated KL scenarios, the researchers iteratively
reviewed and synthesised KL incidents reported in the literature against the developed framework.

4.1 KL Behavioural Framework
Conceptualising confidential KLR is based on five parameters (adapted from Shabtai et al. (2012)):
where the KL occurs, who caused the KL (human threat agent), how access to the knowledge was gained,
the nature of the leakage, and how the knowledge leaked.
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4.1.1 Where did knowledge leakage occur?
The first parameter refers to the possible locations of KL, which can be divided into three areas. First,
inside the organisation, meaning the KL incident occurs within the organisation’s physical boundaries
(Hislop et al. 2018), such as two teams from different departments working collaboratively. Second,
outside the organisation, meaning the KL incident occurs outside the organisation’s physical boundaries
(Frishammar et al. 2015), such as confidential new product designs were stolen from an employee’s
computer outside the organisation. In the third method, the KL occurs at a third-party’s physical
location (Ritala et al. 2018).

4.1.2 Who caused knowledge leakage?
The second parameter highlights the possible human threat agents who would leak knowledge, which
follows the KL locations: an insider, an outsider, or an external insider. An insider is an internal trusted
source resident within the organisation, such as a knowledge worker or other regular employee (Hislop
et al. 2018). Outsiders mean that the KL or stealing occurs from an external source, such as competitors
attempting to steal knowledge assets (Inkpen et al. 2019). External insiders mean that the KL source is
a trusted partner who has worked in the organisation but is currently working elsewhere, such as a
contractor (consultancy) (Ritala et al. 2018).

4.1.3 How was access to knowledge gained?
The third parameter explains the access privilege of the KL source. Access privilege to knowledge assets
can be placed into two categories: authorised or unauthorised (Hislop et al. 2018). In KL scenarios,
authorised refers to trusted individuals who obtain a legitimate access to knowledge assets —either
insiders such as knowledge workers or external insiders such as suppliers (Shabtai et al. 2012).
Unauthorised individuals would be insiders who do not have legal access to knowledge assets, as their
daily work does not require accessing confidential knowledge such as new interns or employees from
different departments (Lee et al. 2017) or competitors (Frishammar et al. 2015).

4.1.4 The nature of leakage
The fourth parameter indicates the intention of the person leaking knowledge – whether it is deliberate
or accidental (Agudelo-Serna et al. 2015). Accidental means knowledge was unwittingly leaked as a
result of performing an organisation process or participating in an informal event (Bulgurcu et al. 2010).
Deliberate means that knowledge was leaked on purpose with malicious intent, ignoring organisational
security and knowing the confidentiality of the knowledge and the occupational hazards of the KL
incident (Nishat Faisal et al. 2007).

4.1.5 The medium of knowledge leakage
The last parameter highlights the KL medium: physical, digital, or conversational. Distinguishing
between the mediums might be useful, as the discussion around knowledge protection would be
different. Physical KL occurs through physical means (documents, diagrams, or handwritten notes)
(Durst and Zieba 2019); digital leaks occur through emails, social media, BYOD, and intranet (Ilvonen
et al. 2018). Conversational KL means verbal leakage during occasions like professional conferences,
Q&A sessions (Ritala et al. 2018); or informal occasions such as casual events (Olander et al. 2015).

4.1.6 Knowledge leakage behaviour scenarios
Table 2 shows our framework that combines each of the parameters of KL. We have also included
representative references for the KL parameter combinations. Eighteen Generic KL Scenarios were
developed based on the KL parameters discussed (see Appendix A for sample scenarios).

5 FINDINGS
Two main themes were identified in our analysis: interpersonal enabling factors and organisational
practices around KL mitigation. Sub themes included: KL behaviour and employees’ personality traits,
poor knowledge classification practices, and poor knowledge security management practices.

5.1 Individual-level enabling factors
Participants discussed the individual-level factors that contributed to KL behaviour, which highlighted
two sub-themes. The first sub-theme is KL behaviour. Participants suggested that some employees’ KL
behaviours are difficult to address with security controls. As P1 states: ‘You can’t label word of mouth ...
for now, we have no formal or technological controls about what people can say or not say’. Employee
mobility is also an issue with P1 suggesting ‘...leaking is when an employee of organisation A that has
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knowledge of how that organisation operates moves to organisation B’. Furthermore, P4 suggests that
this is even harder from a social engineering aspect, ‘The Threat Ops… went after competitors across
the globe to collect human interventions’. (P4).

Where
Leakage
Occurs
Inside
Inside
Inside
Inside
Inside
Inside
Inside
Inside
Inside
Outside
Outside
Outside
3rd Party
3rd Party
3rd Party
3rd Party
3rd Party
3rd Party

Cause of
Leakage
Insider
Insider
Insider
Insider
Insider
Insider
Insider
Insider
Insider
Outsider
Outsider
Outsider
Ext Insider
Ext Insider
Ext Insider
Ext Insider
Ext Insider
Ext Insider

Parameters of KL
Authorised/
Leakage Leakage Medium
Representative References
Unauthorised
Nature
Access
Authorised
Accidental
Physical
(Hislop et al. 2018; Ritala et al.
2015)
Authorised
Accidental
Digital
Authorised
Accidental
Conversation
Authorised
Deliberate
Physical
(Hislop et al. 2018; Ritala et al.
2015)
Authorised
Deliberate
Digital
Authorised
Deliberate
Conversation
Unauthorised
Deliberate
Physical
(Lee et al. 2017)
Unauthorised
Deliberate
Digital
Unauthorised
Deliberate
Conversation
Unauthorised
Deliberate
Physical
(Frishammar et al. 2015)
Unauthorised
Deliberate
Digital
Unauthorised
Deliberate
Conversation
Authorised
Accidental
Physical
(Jiang et al. 2013; Ritala et al.
2015)
Authorised
Accidental
Digital
Authorised
Accidental
Conversation
Authorised
Deliberate
Physical
(Frishammar et al. 2015; Shabtai
et al. 2012)
Authorised
Deliberate
Digital
Authorised
Deliberate
Conversation

Scenario

The second sub-theme is employees’ motivation. During the discussion, participants stated that an
employee’s intrinsic/extrinsic motivation might influence his/her tendencies to engage in unauthorised
disclosure of confidential knowledge through KL risk behaviours. This theme was elaborated as: a sense
of entitlement with P3 stating: ‘… to share that knowledge is he wants to feel empowered or he wants
to feel important’. Additionally, P6 discussed the employees’ ambition to protect or advance themselves:
‘… Maybe for their own benefit, as you can say to get more business—to share that information with a
competitor’. Finally, P2 comments on motivation from a competitor nature perspective: ‘Maybe the
person is competitive in nature and he wants to boast about his projects’.

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R

Table 2: Knowledge leakage behavioural framework showing scenarios.

5.2 Organisational practices around knowledge leakage mitigation
The second main theme identified was organisation practices around KL mitigation and is characterised
around poor knowledge sensitivity classification and poor knowledge security practices. Participants
discussed poor knowledge sensitivity classification in some detail. P6 said ‘Potentially, these
organisations don’t have classification of the information and they’re enabling people to send
attachments outside the organisation.’ (Q2). P1 indicated that this might just be poor labelling practices:
‘…But for that classification, do they have labelling? If it’s a confidential document, was it
appropriately labelled?’, however P3 stated that this might go further and be an improper balance of
classification between what needs to be shared and what needs to be confidential ‘I think that part of
the problem is organisations need to know what is IP … Too much of a lockdown will curtail
collaboration between organisations. Too much of openness, scenarios will happen like this’.
Poor knowledge security management practices refers to the security practices applied within the
organisation. Participants revealed consensus on the key role that organisation security practices play
in facilitating or controlling KL behaviour. Participants discussed the incompleteness of some
knowledge security management practices influencing KL behaviour. These inconsistencies included
poor internal risk assessment practices: ‘Whenever there’s a major change within an organisation
where people will be demoted or people will be let go, the organisation should be more vigilant in terms
of who should have access to what. And who is actually accessing what’ (P2); poor
compartmentalisation practices: ‘limit the CFO’s access to information that relates to the financing, not
to the technical documentation, because regardless of how senior they are, they don’t need access to
designs and technologies’ (P7). In terms of controlling KL behaviour, participants agreed on the
criticality of three security controls: human resource management practices: ‘Which is what it’s about
so much of the time, isn’t it? It’s about people: getting the right person in the first place’ (P6); knowledge
security training and awareness practices: ‘organisations will be going to have a good HR… you can
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build it [KL scenario] into your security training and awareness scheme … can train on different things
[KL scenarios]” (P7); and compartmentalisation practices: ‘But they’re [colleagues] working at two
separate projects. He shouldn’t have access to the other project’s documentation. There should be
proper segregation’ (P5).

6 DISCUSSION
In the findings, we identified components related to interpersonal enabling factors and organisational
practices around KL mitigation. In this discussion we focus on three key security controls that had
superior impacts in inhibiting the identified key factors of KL.

6.1 Human Resource Management Practices
Human resource management (HRM) practices refer to how human resources work to mitigate KL
behavioural risk. We found that HRM practices inhibit some of the identified key factors: KL behaviour,
employees’ personality traits, and poor knowledge management practices. KL occurs through accidental
sharing behaviours (Ritala et al. 2015). Our findings extend this and demonstrate that HRM is a key
control for mitigating accidental leakage. First, HRM practices help to increase employees’ sense of
responsibility; reminding them of their shared roles as protectors of knowledge assets. This confirms
Hislop et al.'s (2018's) work who states that increasing an employee’s sense of responsibility increases
their level of confidential knowledge handling care. Extending this, a significant sense of responsibility
is also reflected by the employees decreased susceptibility to social engineering. Further, our findings
suggest that good HRM practices improve knowledge protection, as they contribute to employees’
commitment to that knowledge. Inkpen et al. (2019) argue that managing KL behavioural risk via an
employee mobility channel doesn’t help to protect organisational knowledge. However, our participants
confirm employee mobility as an enabler for KL arguing that controlling KL behaviour via managing
employees’ mobility was ideal. In this study, participants demonstrate that HRM security practice can
mitigate KL via managing employees’ mobility behaviour.
Employees’ motivations have been largely neglected in KL literature. Our participants argue that a key
HRM security practice is proper hiring practice, which would exclude people whose attributes make
them seem more vulnerable than others. HRM hiring activities include pre-employment screening,
background checks, psychological screening, and interviews. For instance, hiring practices could assess
intrinsic / extrinsic motivations (using self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 2012; Ryan and Deci
2017) of employees to assess how likely an employee needs to have these motivations satisfied. Also,
organisations can develop interventions to reduce the impact on extrinsic motivations to reduce their
impact (Brown and Kasser 2005). Shaw and Stock (2011) argued that organisations that perform preemployment background checks would be in a better position to mitigate insiders’ deliberate breaching
behaviour. This study affirms that KIOs should be more vigilant in selecting their employees, whether
regular employees or third parties, especially when KIOs’ activities involve IP. According to Lee et al.
(2017), internal monitoring practices create a protected internal atmosphere. Our findings suggested
that continued monitoring would improve the overall work climate that deters KL behaviour.
Participants reported that embedding HRM practices within internal risk assessment practices is
beneficial, especially when organisational changes occur. Shaw and Stock (2011) reported that when
organisational changes are improperly introduced to the employees—meaning without assessing the
internal risks that would arise from these changes—KL behaviour might occur. The findings expanded
on that claim by emphasising HRM security practices’ role in monitoring employees’ behaviour and risk
profiling them. HRM practices with effective reinforcement include communicating the value
proposition of the security controls to the employees. According to Bulgurcu et al. (2010), employees’
understanding of the value of security controls increases their compliance with these controls. We saw
a similar outcome, adding that developing employees’ understanding of the benefits and importance of
complying with knowledge protection controls influences their compliant behaviour, thus mitigating KL
behavioural risk.

6.2 Knowledge Security Training and Awareness Practices
Knowledge security training and awareness practices are key factors for mitigating the KL behavioural
risk. Alshaikh et al. (2018) argued that training and awareness controls underpin the organisation’s
security controls. Participants confirmed this, adding that improper knowledge security training and
awareness practices undermine KL controls that an organisation applies. Good knowledge security
training and awareness practices affect employee KL behaviour. Effective awareness campaigns focus
on increasing awareness of employees of the consequences of their risky behaviour and how to handle
confidential knowledge. Kraemer et al. (2009) reports that many employees’ mistakes were results of
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inadequate awareness campaigns. The findings of this study illustrated the effectiveness of situational
training and awareness programs, where security practitioners design them to raise employees’
understanding of KL or social engineering attempts.
Training and awareness practices might lower KL behavioural risk due to employee personality traits.
Elliott et al. (2019) highlight personality traits that some employees bring to the workplace, making
them vulnerable. They argue that employees who are angry at the organisation would pose a threat to
the training program’s aims. Our participants suggested training practices would improve employees’
commitment and loyalty to the organisation. Yalabik et al. (2017) recommended that effective training
activities, such as developing employees’ personal skills and knowledge, could result in greater loyalty
to the organisation. Therefore, our results suggest that when KIOs train and empower their employees,
employee commitment to the organisation increases.
Poor understanding or execution of classification around knowledge in the organisation is reflected in
employee KL behaviours. Situational training programs about the knowledge sensitivity classification
systems maintained by the organisation would lower KL behavioural risk. Kraemer et al. (2009) argues
that the lack of employee training about the organisation’s security might make them more vulnerable
to information risks. The study participants questioned whether employees were trained about the
knowledge classification system, arguing that if KIOs proposed situational training programs that aimed
to educate the employees, many of the presented scenarios would not occur.
Training and awareness practices are connected to the deficiency in knowledge security management
and poor knowledge risk management practices. Our participants illustrate that situational training on
different possible scenarios has a positive impact on the employees’ KL behaviour. Shaw et al. (2009)
argues that sufficient training activities would encourage employees to be more mindful of their own
behaviour and their colleagues’ behaviour. Our study’s participants highlight training and awareness
practices that aim to make employees cautious and more alert, reducing accidental KL behaviour.
Participants complained that inadequate training occurs on incident reporting practices, possibly due
to employees being discouraged from reporting these incidents. Training and awareness programs that
encourage employees to report KL events would aid mitigation of KL behavioural risk: first, by helping
security practitioners identify potential KL risks and second, through security practitioners updating
training programs to mitigate new KL risks. Hence, reducing accidental KL behaviour.

6.3 Compartmentalisation Practices
Our findings question the effectiveness of compartmentalisation as a strategy when security aims to
protect knowledge from behavioural KL. Our participants argue that as knowledge is considered
learning, meaning employees permanently absorb that knowledge, compartmentalisation has limited
security value for mitigating KL behaviour. They argue that in the context of KIOs, organisational change
is constant and transformations, such as those where the organisational hierarchy changes, can result
in sub optimal security arrangements. For example, in an organisational restructure, employees can
change roles or have different responsibilities, however the knowledge from their past is not forgotten.
Also, in changing responsibilities they may gain access to more knowledge, building upon knowledge
from previous positions. What they know before does not affect what they know later; this is not an
issue. However, when their role changes and what the employees know from previous positions becomes
a liability, how can organisations compartmentalise individuals with all their background knowledge?
Compartmentalisation practices can be used to mitigate accidental KL incidents. Baldwin and Henkel
(2015) assert that the segmentation of knowledgeable employees from others can mitigate confidential
knowledge from unauthorised access. Our participants clearly recognise that segmenting employees
who work on confidential knowledge from others eliminates some accidental KL scenarios. However,
this may be an undesired practice as it might negatively affect the secrecy of the overall confidential
knowledge. Instead, organisations should compartmentalise at the knowledge level, with each
knowledgeable employee being assigned a specific subset of the knowledge asset. So, even if the
knowledgeable employee accidentally or deliberately leaks that subset knowledge, KL will have a lesser
impact. This specific partitioning is a better solution where it is difficult for an individual to have the
whole picture of the organisation’s confidential knowledge.
A knowledge sensitivity classification system is an organisation’s understanding of what it has and how
sensitive it is. Elliott et al. (2019) reported secrecy to be an essential element of knowledge sensitivity
classification and that balancing secrecy measures and functionality is a necessity for controlling KL.
Similarly, our participants highlight classification practices in which too much compartmentalisation
might lead employees to bend the rules and accidentally leak knowledge. Participants highlight that
locking a cabinet every time an employee is away, for example, is not practical; as a result, the employees
might think that taking the confidential knowledge with them is safer and more convenient.
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Our participants pointed out a critical risk, which is that the majority of the reported KL scenarios are
caused by authorised sources. As the threat agents need to know the knowledge to complete their work,
these cases are problematic, especially when collaborating with third parties. Previous studies describe
the third-party dilemma as the ‘paradox of openness’ (Elliott et al. 2019). Our participants shared the
same views and added the risk of knowledgeable insider employees, as they also have a legitimate access
to the knowledge. The security practitioners argued that the current practices of compartmentalisation
would have limited value at this stage.

7 CONTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we identify the key factors that affect KL in organisations. These factors are evident in an
organisation’s human resource management, knowledge security and awareness training, and
compartmentalisation practices. Altogether, these findings demonstrate that addressing the human
dimension within KL risk research is an essential practice for mitigating KL incidents.
This research contributes first to methodology as we construct an instrument for information collection
(Thomas 2003). To generate the KL scenarios this study developed a KL behavioural risk framework.
According to (Crossler et al. 2013), using scenarios in studying behavioural information security studies
is preferable, as it might expose study participants to scenarios that may be new to them. Using scenariobased questions, the study’s participants reported encountering new behavioural KL incidents.
Moreover, our findings differentiate between the KL mediums, due to the use of the scenarios. Our
participants highlighted that physical and conversational means are the most problematic to mitigate,
whereas there are plenty of digital controls to mitigate KL. Second, from a research contribution
perspective we contribute in two ways. 1) we identify interpersonal KL enabling factors, which are
usually neglected in KL studies. Our study identifies human aspects linked to KL risk and complements
the missing view of understanding KLR. 2) this research disagrees with previous information security
literature regarding the extent to which compartmentalisation would be helpful in mitigating KL. This
is because knowledge as a concept involves learning and interpretation; current compartmentalisation
practices would not be a potent control if the KL source was authorised and has legitimate access to
confidential knowledge. In fact, many reported KL scenarios are from authorised individuals. Therefore,
this study provides an alternative approach of compartmentalisation. We also make contributions to
practice. The innovation literature claims there are few KL controls for an organisation to apply and
there are uncertain benefits from them (Inkpen et al. 2019). Our research suggests that security
practitioners invest in practices to reduce KL: HRM practices, knowledge security training and
awareness practices, and compartmentalisation.
Our research suggests that organisation practices affect KL behaviour; therefore, future research should
investigate organisational characteristics in the developed framework. The investigation of alternative
compartmentalisation strategies to explore the extent of how to mitigate KL is useful. Further,
examining the physical and conversational mediums in more detail, as our findings indicate that KL
from physical mediums is difficult to track and easier to be stolen or lost, and conversational mediums
are difficult to control, as they involve personal judgment and awareness.
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Appendix A – Examples of Scenarios
Scenario C: Sam works as a knowledge manager at Tech Company. At a conference, he talks to a group
of managers from different companies. Two of the managers talk about the outcomes of a major
project that they collaboratively worked on. Sam feels that he is being left out so starts talking about
a new project his company is working on. In doing so, Sam inadvertently divulges some secret details
while bragging.
Scenario F: Tina is the CFO at Innovative Technologies. The company, as a result of a governance
audit, is restructured which results in demotion for Tina to a non-executive position. As a result, Tina,
whilst complaining to a colleague in a rival firm, deliberately discloses trade secrets relating to the
designs of her firm’s latest innovation.
Scenario R: During a visit to Organisation A, Jeff, a consultant, learns about their intentions regarding
critical upcoming investments. Later whilst on another consulting assignment, Jeff discusses these
intentions with a competitor to Organisation A.
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